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THE CHALLENGE
The suggestion that the bar today is subject to widespread
adverse criticism is not a new one.
The lawyer, in former days, was the dignified, scholarly
gentleman whom all the world looked upon with esteem and
respect. He was an educated and cultured individual among
neighbors and friends to whom a college education was rare.
By reason of his training he was looked upon as a champion
of the people, a protector of their rights and liberties. He
was their spokesman at all gatherings; their proud represent-
ative whenever called upon.
The public respected the legal profession as officers of
the Court sworn and selected to courageously stand for prin-
ciples of right, justice and honor.
With the passing of years education has increased, and
the glamour of the bar as the class of distinction through edu-
cation has dulled. Then too the early drama of the Revolu-
tion, the Civil War and the necessity of molding and remold-
ing our fundamentals of goveinment, has progressed almost
to completion. The world as well was progressing in its march
toward materialism. The demand for wealth and the luxuries
of life it afforded was as cogent an appeal to members of the
bar as to others. In the race for wealth the rights of the just
and oppressed and deserving were overlooked. The service
of the member of the bar has been too often limited in its scope
and extent to the amount of remuneration. This type of
service rendered by the bar lowers it to the par of a "trade"
rendered strictly upon the basis of remuneration.
The world debacle and its subsequent crises have again
aroused the bar of our country. Just as the balmy days of
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wealth brought an indifference to substantive rights, and more
attention to material matters, so the present depression should
again bring the bar back to its esteemed place in society. It
is a challenge to the bar to render such service as to regain
its dignity as a profession and not merely to be in the classifi-
cation of a trade. The opportunity is here again for the bar
to serve our country, our cities and our people with a deep-
seated sense of duty, guided by a sense of honor, carried for-
ward by the ideals of a noble profession to place at the com-
mand of the people its finest brains and noblest characters
to solve the present dilemma; to again elevate our profession
to its rightful sphere and perform its duties with honor and
dignity and with equal rigor serve the impoverished or the
wealthy when the causes are just.
NATIONAL BAR EXAMINERS CONFERENCE
This body has successfully completed its first year of
existence. Its objects are to increase the efficiency of exami-
ners and examinations so as to admit only those qualified to
enter into our profession. Members of the Denver Bar who
have been interested in the movement and assisted in its ac-
complishments are Wilbur Denious, Will Shafroth and
Stanley T. Wallbank. Mr. Shafroth serves as Secretary and
Treasurer for a second term and publishes monthly the "Bar
Examiner", the organ of the Conference. Mr. Wallbank was
appointed to serve upon its Executive Committee.
PRECEDENTS
Recently Clarence Darrow is reported as having said
"Lawyers are interested in preserving the past. There is
nothing sacred to them unless it has existed before. They are
against anything new". This statement was seized by the
press as a prize morsel of criticism of the bar. It is granted
that as a rule lawyers are conservative and carefully seek for
precedent upon which to be guided in present problems. The
law however is progressive and changing with the times. Its
progress is necessarily slower since it desires to build solidly
and firmly. Being guided by precedents is no more than ap-
plying the common adage "experience speaks".
REVIEW OF RECENT ACTIVITIES TO
ELIMINATE LAY ENCROACHMENTS
By John R. Snively of the Illinois Bar*
N the past the legal profession has given little attention to
the encroachment of corporations and laymen upon the
practice of law. However, the continued and rapidly in-
creasing encroachment has caused considerable activity in the
last several years. Many proceedings have been instituted in
the courts over the country to check and prevent the same. I
desire, however, in this presentation to review the activities to
eliminate the encroachments of Collection Agencies and
Credit Associations.
In presenting the same I will first trace the development
of the Collection Agency. The earliest encroachment upon
the practice of law was made by the Collection Agericy, yet
the Collection Agency is of comparatively recent development.
Bradstreet Co. and R. G. Dun & Co., the two national
mercantile agencies, were organized between 1842 and 1848.
The former never entered the collection field but the latter
in 1851 established a collection agency service for the use of
its own subscribers. For a period of approximately twenty
years few competitors appeared in the collection field.
About 1870, "Attorneys Lists" came into existence. They
were originally simply lists of attorneys that handled collec-
tions and were sold outright. However, it was only a short
time until the publishers of the lists found that it was a source
of considerable profit to take the collections direct, although
the original subscription fee was included in the contract for
this service. The development of the Attorney's Lists was
rapid until today there are over one hundred lists on the
market.
The foregoing were for many years the only sources
through which slow collections could be made. About 1888
an individual in Chicago conceived the idea of establishing
an agency for the purpose of recovering that class of claims
which the mediums then in the field failed to reach. His
"Member of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, American Bar
Association. Presented at a public meeting of the committee held in the United States
Chamber of Commerce Building, Washington, D. C., October 11, 1932.
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original plan consisted in selling to merchants throughout the
country a system of form letters calculated to frighten the
debtors into a settlement. The fame of this system spread
rapidly. However, he soon changed the system and sent out
the letters himself. In this way a larger profit was possible.
The methods resorted to through the mails became gradually
more offensive until a storm of protests rendered interference
by the postal authorities imperative. Finally, almost every
objectionable feature of the system was absolutely prohibited.
Inventive genius, however, was not lacking. The result was
the bad debt collector. Burly, uniformed collectors were
used. In many cities funeral equipages, with collection agency
signs, called regularly on obstinate cases. Enraged victims
reduced many of these Black Marias to kindling wood.
The evils of this method soon resulted in as wide a protest
as the mail system precipitated. Civil suits were instituted
and pressed vigorously. In the end many of the blackmail
practices were eliminated.
The present day Collection Agency continues to use the
personal solicitation and letter writing system. However, its
activities consist largely of the institution of suit to enforce
collection of the accounts. In the event that one or two letters
fail to bring results it threatens to institute suit. Suit is then
instituted by the Collection Agency and judgment secured.
Today, practically the entire collection business of the
country is controlled by the Collection Agencies, Credit Asso-
ciations and Law Lists. This business has passed into their
hands because they can advertise for and solicit it. In addi-
tion, the Credit Associations solicit claims in Bankruptcy from
creditors. These claims are handled by their salaried lawyers
and the fees that are received are used to support the other
activities of the Associations. The Law Lists furnish an
opportunity for the subscriber to advertise and solicit business.
The basic weakness, however, is the fact that representation
in the list is sold to the lawyer. Such lists should be supported,
not by the lawyer, but by the creditor. In this way the pub-
lisher would be able to select only lawyers who are thoroughly
qualified.
During the past two years there has been considerable
litigation in the State of Ohio. At Cleveland petitions for
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injunction have been filed in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County against thirty corporations. These corpora-
tions include Automobile Associations, Credit Men's Associa-
tion, Property Owners' Associations, Title Companies and
Trust Companies. Similar proceedings have been brought
in the courts at Cincinnati, Columbus, Steubenville and To-
ledo. All of the proceedings were instituted by individual
attorneys with the exception of the case of United Mercantile
Agency v. Robert B. Lybarger, 28 Nisi Prius, New Series,
319, in the Municipal Court of Columbus. In this case the
agency brought suit to recover a fee in a case in which it had
instituted suit for a client. The Court held that it could not
recover because it was engaged in the practice of law.
The most outstanding case is Dworken v. Apartment
House Owners' Association of Cleveland, 38 Ohio Appellate
265, 176 North Eastern 577, which was decided by the Court
of Appeals of Cuyahoga County on March 9, 1931. In this
case the defendant maintained a legal department and em-
ployed lawyers to furnish legal services to its members. Such
services included the collection of accounts and the institution
of suit to enforce payment of the same. It also handled forci-
ble entry and detainer cases. The trial Court held that the
defendant was engaged in the practice of law and granted
the injunction. The Court of Appeals entered judgment for
the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion in the
Supreme Court for an order directing the Court of Appeals
to certify its record. On June 10, 1931, the Supreme Court
denied this motion.
In Dworken v. The Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Com-
pany, the Court of Common Pleas enjoined the defendant
from advertising that it maintained or conducted a legal de-
partment for the benefit of its members, from soliciting mem-
berships under any agreement whereby it agreed to furnish
legal services or advice, from maintaining a legal department
for any purpose other than to handle the immediate affairs
pertaining to the corporate entity, from filing prosecuting or
defending, through itself or attorneys any actions or suits on
behalf of another and from furnishing legal counsel or advice
to its members or others. It was further set forth in the decree
that nothing therein should be construed to prevent the de-
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fendant from conducting a department for the collection of
accounts, notes, contracts or other commercial obligations for
its members if its services were limited to presenting claims
for payments and remitting collections if received upon de-
mand or presentment, or by handling without rendering any
services requiring professional legal skill or the application
of law to the facts.
At Toledo petitions for injunction have been filed in the
Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County against the Mer-
chants Credit and Adjustment Company, The Buckeye Mer-
cantile Agency, and The Toledo Association of Credit Men.
The petitions alleged in part that the defendants operated
collection agencies for the collection of claims, debts and de-
mands for the public generally and contracted with merchants
and others to collect claims, debts and demands owing to them,
for a valuable consideration. It was further alleged that the
defendants attempted to collect and did collect for a valuable
consideration, debts, claims and demands, belonging to per-
sons and other corporations by threatening the debtors of such
persons or corporations that if they would not pay the same
the defendants would bring or cause to be brought, legal action
against said debtors to enforce the payment thereof. The
defendants in the first two proceedings filed motions to strike
these allegations from the petitions on the ground that they
were immaterial and irrelevant and that the facts did not con-
stitute the practice of law. Judge Charles M. Milroy, on
July 9, 1931, overruled the motions, thereby holding that such
allegations constituted the practice of law.
The Buckeye Mercantile Agency case was heard by
Judge Stuart in May of this year. I understand that he sub-
mitted the case to all of the Judges of the Court of Common
Pleas of Lucas County. A decision has not yet been announced.
In Blake v. Ohio Bureau of Credits, which was decided
by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, on
February 19, 1932, the Court said that the preparation of the
necessary papers, filing and conducting suits, and endeavoring
to enforce judgments by proceedings in aid of execution con-
stitute the practice of law.
The Court further said that being precluded from either
directly or indirectly bringing and prosecuting legal proceed-
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ings to enforce collections, the defendant had no right to
threaten that it would institute legal proceedings and it would
be enjoined from so doing. It would further be enjoined from
sending either by mail or otherwise, to a debtor any paper or
document simulating or intended to simulate a legal document
for the purpose of enforcing a collection. The Court allowed
a permanent injunction which in addition to the above en-
joined the defendant from maintaining a legal department
for the benefit of others. (4 Ohio Bar 613).
In re Scott, 52 Federal (2d) 89, was decided by the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, on October 2, 1931. In this case the Grand Rapids
Credit Men's Association solicited claims in bankruptcy suits.
The proof of claim authorized the Association to attend all
meetings of creditors and to vote in the election of trustee.
The Referee refused to approve the selection of the Trustee
made by the Association. The Court said that the power of
Attorney included the power to vote for or against any pro-
posed resolution in reference to the estate, in the choice of
trustee, to accept or refuse any composition, and do such acts
as fully as the creditor could if personally present. It further
said that the examination of the bankrupt and the participa-
tion in the election of a trustee by others than the creditor him-
self was the practice of law as generally understood and had
been so recognized by the courts, citing In re Looney, 262
Federal 209, and In re H. E. Ploof Machinery Co., 243
Federal 421.
Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc. vs. Haworth Marble
Co., 40 Ohio Appellate 255, 178 North Eastern 703, was de-
cided by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County on No-
vember 2, 1931. In this case the plaintiff instituted suit in the
Municipal Court of Cleveland to recover compensation for
services rendered under a contract. By this contract the
plaintiff had agreed to examine and analyze freight bills for
the previous three years and to prepare, file, prosecute and
adjust all claims developed on such bills, as well as to take
the necessary procedure to effect all possible rate and classi-
fication reductions on defendant's shipments. The bills were
examined and the plaintiff filed claims before the Interstate
Commerce Commission and appeared before it.
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The Court recognized in its opinion that the Interstate
Commerce Commission was created by an Act of Congress
and was given authority to adopt rules of practice. In this
connection the Commission had adopted a rule allowing any
person who was possessed of satisfactory legal and technical
qualifications to appear before it. The Court said that prac-
tice before the Interstate Commerce Commission, Commis-
sioner of Patents, Treasury Department and United States
Board of Tax Appeals was not limited to lawyers.
The Court further said that the collection of claims with-
out resort to courts at law does not constitute the practice of
law. However, this suit was based upon a contract which by
its terms contemplated the prosecution of claims before a
Court of Justice and this would render the contract void.
Therefore, the Court held that the use of the words "to prose-
cute" without limiting them to activities other than the insti-
tution of proceedings before a Court, made the petition subject
to demurrer and affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.
State of Tennessee ex rel. v. Retail Credit Men's Asso-
ciation of Chattanooga, 163 Tennessee 450, 43 South Western
(2d) 918, was decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee on
December 5, 1931. In this case the defendant operated a
Collection department. It solicited claims for collection with
the understanding with its clients that suit would be instituted
by it and collection enforced by legal process. It also em-
ployed an attorney to bring suits on claims placed with it for
collection. The Chancellor declined to vacate its charter but
granted an injunction which enjoined these practices. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. It was also affirmed
by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant was not practicing law in making reports
to its members as to the title to real estate.
In State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail Merchants Associa-
tion of Enid, the District Court on April 13, 1932, enjoined
the defendant from soliciting, or advertising for or holding
itself out as being engaged in the collection of debts, claims
and demands through the courts, from threatening debtors by
sending to them "Notice of Impending Suit", or any other
similar threat, or to threaten them with any action by the
Court, or from filing any suits, or from collecting any attor-
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ney fee on any claims placed with it for collection, or from
rendering any legal advice, or holding. itself out to the public
as maintaining a legal department, or from employing an
attorney to institute suits for it on any debt, claim or demand
held by it for collection, or from taking any part of any fee
allowed to any attorney in the collection of any such debts,
provided that the defendant should be allowed to operate a
collection agency for the collection of the debts of its mem-
bers, however, to be limited to the solicitation of such debts
against third persons and to presenting said debts for payment
without however, rendering or attempting to render services
requiring professional legal skill or knowledge.
The General Assembly of Virginia in 1924 passed an act
which provided that it should be unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation not being an attorney duly authorized to
practice in Virginia, to present the claim or cause of any other
person, firm or corporation before any Magistrate, Civil or
Police Justice, Civil Justice Court or any other Court unless
said person, firm or corporation so appearing has a property
interest in said claim or cause, and that it should be unlawful
for any firm, person, or corporation to assign to any other
person, any claim or cause or any interest in any claim or cause,
for the purpose of having the said claim or cause, or any ih-
terest therein represented before any Court by any person,
firm or corporation, not an attorney. It further provided
that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent any
person, firm or corporation from representing his or their
claim, or from preventing any person, firm or corporation
from having his or their regularly employed agent or em-
ployee from appearing where such agent was regularly em-
ployed on a salary basis. (Code of Virginia 3426-A). An
amendment of 1930 provided that if it appeared that any civil
warrant issued at the instance of or on behalf of any person
prohibited from representing such claim before a Justice, it
should be the duty of the Justice to forthwith dismiss such
warrant at the cost of the plaintiff.
About two years ago, Sam A. Pusey of the Pusey Adjust-
ment Co. at Richmond, Virginia, had a civil warrant issued
against Marie E. Gillespie on the claim of Dr. E. C. Bryce.
A motion was made to dismiss the case and same was allowed.
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The case was then appealed to the Law and Equity Court of
Richmond. This Court affirmed the judgment of the Civil
Justice Court. A writ of error was granted to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia where the case is now pending.
In 1927 the Legislature of Alabama amended Section
6248 of the Alabama Code, which theretofore merely pro-
vided that only persons regularly licensed should have author-
ity to practice law and wrote into the section a definition of
the practice of law. Subdivision D reads as follows: Who-
ever "as a vocation enforces, secures, settles, adjusts or com-
promises, defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims
or demands between persons with neither of whom he is in
privity or in the relation of employer and employee in the
ordinary sense, is practicing law".
In Kendrick v. State, 218 Alabama 277, the Supreme
Court of Alabama passed upon the constitutionality of the
Act. Kendrick, who operated a collection agency, had been
arrested for practicing law. He was convicted in the Circuit
Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in a
per curiam opinion reported in 120 Southern 140 and the case
went to the Supreme Court. It held that the act was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it prohibited anyone but licensed attor-
neys from collecting claims because the act violated the Ala-
bama Constitution which prohibited a statute from containing
more than one subject, which must be clearly expressed in
its title.
In the opinion Mr. Justice Sayre said:
"To engage in the business of collecting claims by demand
or negotiation out of court is not to practice law."
It was soon discovered that the case had been decided
without any brief being submitted by the State. An effort
was then made to have the Court restore the case to the docket,
so that the Bar might have an opportunity to present the
matter. It was suggested that the Attorney General make
application to the Court of Appeals for a rehearing. This
was done. However, the petition was denied. Application
was then made to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Court however, in a per curiam opinion reported in 120
Southern 144 denied the writ.
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An Act, regulating and defining the practice of law in
the State of Alabama was approved July 20, 1931. Subdi-
vision D was the same as that in the former act. The validity
of this Act was upheld in Berk v. State ex rel. Thompson, 255
Alabama ......... , 142 Southern 832, which was decided by the
Supreme Court of Alabama on May 26, 1932. The petition
alleged that the defendant was engaged in the business of
conducting a commercial collection agency as a vocation in
which he was holding himself out to the public as being ready
for a consideration to represent out of court anyone in the
adjustment, collection or compromise of any defaulted, con-
troverted or disputed account, claim or demand which such
person might have against anyone else and that whenever in
his judgment it was necessary he turned it over to his attorney
for prosecution in court. It was further alleged that he
threatened to institute suit and that upon the notes which were
handled by him, he made a charge for services rendered. A
demurrer to the petition was overruled. The lower court
then ordered that the defendant be excluded from the practice
of law until he became regularly licensed.
In its opinion the Supreme Court said that it had been
the usual business of a lawyer, for the past hundred years in
this state, to engage in office practice as well as in cases needed
in and about the collection and settlement of claims and de-
mands. The Court held that the acts recited in the petition
constituted the practice of law as defined in the statute. It
further said in the opinion that the act was a valid enactment
under the police power, and offended neither state nor Federal
constitution, was not a usurpation of judicial power and
neither denied to citizens equal civil rights, nor granted special
privileges and immunities. The judgment of exclusion and
prohibition was affirmed.
In Hudson Valley Board of Trade, Inc. v. Fraser P.
Price, which was decided by the City Court of White Plains,
New York, on October 22, 1931, the plaintiff brought suit on
a claim that had been assigned to it by Frank H. Knight.
This claim had been solicited by the plaintiff for the purpose
of bringing suit thereon. Such solicitation was prohibited
by Section 280 of the Penal Law. The Court held that the
plaintiff could not recover and dismissed the complaint.
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In Retail Credit Men's Association v. R. E. Callahan,
Judge Ida May Adams of the Municipal Courtof Los Angeles
in September, 1931, held that a collection agency that sued
on assigned claims was engaged in the illegal practice of law.
The legality of an assignment depends upon whether or
not it was for a lawful purpose. If the assignment is for the
purpose of enabling the assignee to practice law when he is
not licensed, the assignment is illegal and the defendant may
raise the point in his answer.
Whenever the matter of the legal purpose of the assign-
ment has been properly raised, the Appellate Courts have
uniformly held that it was a proper defense, and that if the
assignment was in violation of the law as regards the right
to practice law, the action could not be maintained. (Bulke-
ley v. Bank of California, 68 California 80; Tuller v. Arnild,
98 California 522; Koepple v. Morrison, 84 California Ap-
peals 137).
It is our duty to protect the public from the evil effects
of lay encroachments. The responsibility is our own. If the
independence and integrity of this great profession is to be
maintained, it is imperative that the members of the local bar
associations throughout the entire United States assume this
responsibility and take such action as may be necessary. Con-
tempt, Injunction and Quo Warranto proceedings have been
very effective. Such remedies should be pursued courageously.
However, this problem will never be solved entirely by
the institution of legal proceedings against those who persist
in such practices. It has been decided that any member of the
bar who assists a corporation to practice law or render legal
services is subject to discipline by the Supreme Court. (In
re Otterness, 181 Minnesota 254, 232 North Western 318).
He may even be deprived of his right to practice. Hence, if
we will proceed against the members of the bar who partici-
pate in such practices, we will strike at the principal cause of
lay encroachments. Such practices will then largely cease
and we will have rendered a great service to the public and
the profession.
NoT: A third and final article on the above subject had been prepared by
Roy 0. Samson, of the Denver Bar, covering the cases referred to in Mr. Snively's
statement, which is printed in lieu thereof.
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It is Mr. Samson's opinion that the two previous articles in Dicta, together with
the foregoing, conclusively establish:
1. That the power of a Supreme Court to regulate and control the practice of
law is inherent and plenary and that any legislation on the subject should be con-
strued as in aid, and not restrictive, of the power of the Court.
2. That a corporation cannot practice law, nor can a layman-assignee.
3. That a corporation is engaged in the practice of law when it employs a
lawyer and pays him a salary to conduct the corporation's alleged law department
for the benefit of its members or clients.
4. That the license to practice of a member of the bar is such a property right,
or franchise, as will permit permanent injunction to issue in its protection.
BAR ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP
The bulletin of the New York State Bar Association de-
votes an entire back page to an appeal to the members of the
Association for new members.
The statement is made that only about one-sixth of the
lawyers of New York are members of the Association.
DICTA wonders how many of the non-members of the
Denver Bar Association are potential members and feels that
with a little publicity and pressure the membership roll of
the Denver Bar Association can be materially increased.
JUDGE HENRY BRAY
Dicta notes the passing on to the Great Beyond of Judge
Henry Bray. He served our community as a judge of various
courts for many years. The bar has lost another of its pioneers.
Recent statistics formulated concerning repeaters at bar
examinations are interesting. In Colorado at the last exami-
nations, 62 candidates presented themselves. Of this number
7 were repeaters. Of the 28 who successfully completed the
examinations, not one was a repeater. The 7 repeaters were
again unsuccessful.
TAXATION
By S. G. McMullin, of the Grand Junction Bar
NUMBER of years ago, Professor Richard T. Ely of
the University of Wisconsin, made the prediction that
in 25 years we would see state socialism because exces-
sive taxation would destroy private ownership of land. Look-
ing at the matter from the present condition, his predictions
seem to be about verified. To be sure, this is not the first time
that there has been a general inability to pay taxes on real
estate due to the financial condition of the owners, but it is
much more serious now because of the tremendous burden
which our system of government and our standard of civiliza-
tion has imposed upon the various states, and living as I do,
in a largely agricultural county, I become more impressed
with the thought that the great problem and predominant
cause of our present depression in this country is excessive
taxation, and that our present system is ineffective, and
destructive.
For the sole purpose of starting a round table on the
question by the bar, I am offering my personal views on the
remedy.*
1. Inasmuch as the protection of government inures to
the benefit of everybody, both male and female, and inasmuch
as a very large percentage of our population are not taxpayers,
it seems to me that part of the revenue necessary for our state
and local government should be secured from per capita
taxes. I don't see why it is not feasible for every adult in the
State of Colorado, as a qualification for the rights of citizen-
ship, to pay a per capita tax of say, $10.00 a year, or even
$5.00 a year; the tax to be a prerequisite to voting and possibly
other rights as valuable, and which are established at public
expense, such as access to the courts. Corporations in this
state are required to pay two kinds of local taxes; one on filing
their annual report, and the other, which is called the flat tax,
and why should this not be extended to all citizens.
2. State income taxes in a state like Colorado, are im-
practical and would be unjust. The feeling is growing that
the ideal tax would be a general sales tax, collected and paid
*Dicta will be pleased to publish any replies received.
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by the seller of merchandise of every kind and description.
The State of Mississippi has been forced to try this experi-
ment, which is still in its infancy and has not had time to dis-
close what, if any, weaknesses there are in the plan, but which,
up to the present time, apparently is accomplishing good
results.
It seems apparent to me that unless taxes, on farms es-
pecially, can be reduced greatly, or even abolished, that there
can be no economic recovery in this country. We are facing,
under the present rate of consumption, an over-production in
everything, and production must be curtailed, which will in
itself reduce income to a point where there is no room for the
payment of taxes by the average farmer. In addition, the day
is fast approaching when instead of looking upon the big
corporations of this state, like the railroads, as an inexhaustible
source of revenue for the purpose of carrying out the fads and
fancies of government, especially education, it will become a
matter of first concern to help them maintain themselves so
that they can furnish proper service, and reduce their rates
and charges to meet present day conditions.
It seems further, that there is a general lack of business
efficiency in the collection of taxes. I know of no county
treasurer's office that is equipped to keep track of and see that
the collection of personal taxes is made, nor do I know of any
county treasurer's office where accumulated taxes on aban-
doned property are being worked out, or where deeds are be-
ing taken by the County so that the land can-be resold to some-
one who will utilize it and put it in the taxpaying class again.
Our present system of taxes is based on the idea that
real estate is the basis of all value. In the economic evolution,
especially since the World War, conditions have destroyed the
foundation for this belief and our system of taxation has not
kept march with the change of conditions. One cause of the
bitterness of the farming class in this country is their feeling
that the principal wealth of the country, to-wit, stocks and
bonds, and other securities, escapes any taxation whatever,
while they pay more than their proportionate share.
I hope this will start a train of thought which will result
in a movement to develop a present day working system of
taxation.
SAMUEL E. BROWNE
THE LITTLE GENERAL FROM OHIO
By William H. Robinson, Jr., of the Denver Bar
HE parade of law is serene and majestic. There is no
tramping of feet; there is no playing of bands-no
fanfare of trumpets; there are no plaudits of the mul-
titude. So quietly does it pass that the onlookers are scarcely
aware that there has been a parade. Consequently its marchers
are nearly forgotten the moment they are out of sight, and
yet law marches toward constructive and not destructive ef-
fort; it has a drama that is equally as fascinating as that of the
parade of war, but its drama is concerned with the lives of
men, not with the death of men.
The parade has stopped in front of us for a few brief
seconds.' We see Denver as it was in the sixties-a crude
frontier town in which legal institutions are almost unknown.
Less than a half dozen lawyers had arrived in Denver as early
as 1858-1859, but the small group that was to lead in the de-
velopment of the law in the west came for the most part
throughout the decade of the sixties. A host of courts in the
city was attempting to administer justice. The probate and
justice of peace courts established by the late Territory of
Kansas, though still in existence, were "cut off in the midst
of their usefulness and left to dry up like leaves on a dead
branch." The district court presided over by Judge Allison
and the county court under the direction of Judge J. Bryant
Smith were unpopular. The extra-legal, People's Court,
whose judges were Nelson Sargent and Jacob Downing, did
most of the business. In addition to these courts there was the
Claim's Club which by self-constituted judicial power regu-
lated "rights to possession of land claims"; the High Court
of the People which met irregularly to try murder cases, and
the Miner's Courts. The great variety and diversity of these
courts made the practice of law perplexing and uncertain.
Perhaps the only certain thing to the lawyer was the very
'This article is the first of a series to appear in Dicta on the lives of Denver
lawyers who were practicing in Denver during 1860-1870.
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positive prohibition against them practicing in most of the
Miner's Courts
Into this bramble bush of courts, President Lincoln sent
Samuel E. Browne, in May, 1862, as the first United States
Attorney for the district of Colorado.3 When Browne arrived
in Denver he was taken to the barroom of the Planter's Hotel
where the District Court, presided over by Judge B. F. Hall
was in session.' Everyone in the "courtroom" wore a brace
of revolvers and few men had seen fit to remove their hats.
Browne was startled and shocked, but he had the good judg-
ment not to show it. This experience was his first in a frontier
court. He had been born and reared in the East; and there
amongst its courts and in the halls of the national government
he had so far spent his life.
He was born May 12, 1822, in Franklin County, Penn-
sylvania. In 1849 he was graduated from Marshall College
in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania; and after receiving his diplo-
ma, he taught school for three years. Beginning his study
of law under the tutelage of D. F. Robinson in the spring of
1843, he completed his study under the supervision of Judge
William A. Rogers at Springfield, Ohio, the following year;
and on June 7, 1845, he was admitted to the bar of Ohio. For
about fifteen years thereafter in the life of Samuel E. Browne
there followed a period of unrest and indecision. In January,
1845, he moved to Wert, Ohio, where he began to practice
law, but shortly thereafter he moved to Delphos, Ohio. About
ten years later he moved again-this time to Piqua, Ohio.
Soon after he had taken up his residence, he was selected as
the official reporter of the Ohio Senate. He continued his
practice of law in Piqua, however, until 1860 when he was
elected a member of the legislature for a period of two years.
When the Civil War was declared, Browne was appointed as
quartermaster of the Army of Ohio under General McClellan.
'Denver Republican September 13, 1883. For a more detailed discussion of the
early courts see STONE'S HISTORY OF COLORADO.
For a description of courtroom scenes in Colorado's early courts see a series of
articles in Dicta during 1931 by Fred Holland, and the biographies of Thomas,
Belford, and Hughes by William Robinson in the Rocky Mountain Law Review during
1930-1932.
' Strictly speaking there was no such office as the United States District Attorney
for Colorado at that time. Browne was designated as Attorney-general and from
this designation came his nickname of "general".
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Camp Putnam was established by Browne under the super-
vision of General McClellan, and when this task was com-
pleted Browne was placed in charge of the commissary de-
partment. In this command he seized the steamship Ohio,
and on it transported the Fourteenth Ohio Regulars to
Parkersburg, Virginia, where they took possession of the city.
This act was the first invasion of southern states by the army
of the North.
Recognition for his services was swift, and in July, 1861,
he was sent to Washington, D. C., where he was appointed
captain of the Seventeenth regular Infantry by President
Lincoln. Within a few months he resigned this commission
to accept the position of assistant Registrar in the Treasury
Department. To finance the war, Congress had decided to
issue $60,000,000 of greenback currency known as demand
notes. On these notes along with that of Secretary of the
Treasury Chase was the name of Samuel Browne. During
that winter he was made virtually a government express agent
whose duty it was to convey money to the federal armies. In
this capacity he distributed $15,000,000. Upon the recom-
mendation of Caleb Smith, Salmon Chase, and Judge Noah
Swain, he was appointed on April 6, 1862, United States
Attorney of Colorado.
Such then was his background as Samuel Browne stood
in the barroom----courtroom in that May day, 1862.6 When
he had accepted the appointment of United States Attorney,
he had been aware of the crudities of frontier courts and jus-
tice, but he had scarcely been prepared for anything like the
sight he then beheld. But he was to receive a further surprise.
As he himself put it twenty-five years later :'
"I came to Colorado under the impression, which is still quite common
among attorneys from the East, that I should find here in the legal profession
few, if any, foemen worthy of my steel. I was soon convinced of my mistake
and was made to feel that I would have to rustle if I wanted to make a
respectable showing among the lawyers of that time."
The first case Browne undertook in Colorado was the
defense of Judge Hall who had been indicted for malfeasance
'B. B. Stiles was clerk of the district court at this time, and A. C. Hunt, later
territorial governor, was the marshal. A. C. Hunt was the brother of Hamilton
Hunt who some years later formed a law partnership with Browne.
Daily News September 13, 1883.
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in office by the Grand Jury. When the true bill had been
returned, Judge Hall consulted Browne who after some re-
flection stated that he believed he saw a solution to the prob-
lem. In Judge Hall's court the following morning, Browne
filed a motion to quash the indictment, stressing the fact that
the indictment had been returned against Hall, the citizen,
and therefore Hall, the judge, had a right to hear the motion
to quash inasmuch as Mr. Hall and Judge Hall were two
different persons in law. Browne then proceeded to point out
a legal defect in the indictment. After gravely listening to
Browne's argument for a half hour, Judge Hall ordered the
motion to be sustained.
Shortly after this incident Hall was replaced by a man
named Gale who knew no law. Probably nothing is more
indicative of the fact that Judge Gale knew no law than of
his unique method of ruling on demurrers. Judge Gale would
hear the demurrers through the week, but would rule on them
only one day each week. On the day that he was to rule on
them, he stacked the demurrers upon his desk, and beginning
at the top he would sustain the first demurrer, overrule the
second, sustain the third, overrule the fourth, and so on
through the entire pile. The lawyers in Denver soon per-
ceived the scheme. One day Browne presented a demurrer
to a complaint and as usual Judge Gale laid it aside to rule
on it on "Demurrer day." The night before the demurrer
was to be ruled upon, Browne had Judge Gale to his home for
dinner. The following morning just as the Judge had reached
his demurrer, which according to the Judge's system was to be
overruled, Browne leaned over the Judge's desk. While en-
gaging the Judge's attention by talking of the dinner party
on the evening before, Browne placed another demurrer on
top of his. True to form, the Judge overruled the demurrer
on top and sustained the next demurrer which was Browne's.
As the Judge announced his decision, the opposing counsel
whispered to Browne, "You old fraud you, I saw you shuffle
the deck on me."
One of the most amusing cases in which Browne in his
capacity of United States Attorney did not fare so well was
tried before Judge Allen A. Bradford in Pueblo. It was a
case involving the theft of a mule. Now Judge Bradford
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while camping-out had had his pet mule, Babylon, stolen from
him several years before, and as a result the judge had been
forced to walk a considerable distance to the nearest town.
As prosecuting attorney Browne in the present case had se-
verely denounced the thief and had demanded his conviction.
During recess of court, however, Browne had received a fee
to get the trial dismissed by payment of a fine. When the
court again convened, Browne asked that the court accept a
fine and turn the thief loose, for "it was only a miserable mule
he stole after all."
Judge Bradford rapped viciously on his desk, "Let the
S-B- stand up. The sentence of this court is that the pris-
oner be confined at hard labor for five years, and the prose-
cuting attorney hand over the fee that he has taken off of the
prisoner to intercede in his behalf to the end that justice be
defeated. This fee will be used to defray the expenses of this
case. Next case."
In 1864 Wilbur F. Stone was appointed assistant United
States attorney. Browne assigned Stone to the disposal of
the criminal cases, while he himself undertook as a general
rule, only the civil cases. In May, 1865, both men resigned
their office, but their resignations were not accepted until
October of that year.
During the years in which he had served as United States
Attorney, Browne frequently saw the federal court held under
the branches of a cottonwood tree or in the largest adobe house
in the region. He had traveled in wagon train and on horse-
back for great distances to attend the sessions of court as it
sat in the several districts. Not infrequently had he seen the
mob snatch a case from the court and administer justice in its
crude but effective way. One of the most famous of these
instances was the trial of U. S. Coe and his gang of bandits.
The Coe gang had been stealing sheep and cattle for some
years. One day after a dramatic capture the gang, riveted
together with iron chain, was herded before the federal court
in Pueblo over which Judge Hallet was presiding. Arrayed
against Browne as prosecuting attorney was Governor
Hinsdale and Tom Nathan. The trial proceeded with a
quadroon, whom the Coe gang had captured as spoil in one
of their raids, giving most of the evidence. The courthouse
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was packed with spectators, most of whom were afraid that
the gang would escape with light sentences. One morning
during the course of trial, hanging from trees along the Foun-
tain River where the Eighth Street Depot of the Rio Grande
was rater located, Coe's body was discovered by early risers.
During the night he had been spirited from the jail by a small
determined group of men and hanged. The rest of the Coe
gang were convicted and sent to Leavenworth penitentiary.
It was not infrequently either that Browne and the federal
judge traveled with a guard of soldiers to keep off the Indians.
The Ute Indians in northern New Mexico were always trou-
blesome. After the battle of Sand Creek in 1865, Browne
secured a leave of absence from the government in order to
raise troops to guard the plains route to Julesburg. Browne
was elected Colonel of the regiment on January 17, 1865, and
that winter he spent on the plains in command of these troops
while Stone carried on the work of the United States Attor-
ney's Office. The Indian uprising was quelled by spring, and
by the end of April Browne mustered out the troops. Although
this was his first Indian expedition, Browne during his life
led many such expeditions.
By now, Browne's private practice had been built up to
a considerable extent and so he resigned his federal appoint-
ment. His own practice was voluminous and successful. It
is said of Browne that if he had been paid one dollar every
time he had appeared in court that he would have been the
richest man in the world. While this is perhaps a hyper-
bolical statement, yet the fact remains that Browne appeared
as counsel in at least twenty-three cases in Volume One of the
Colorado reports, and thereafter averaged eleven appearances
to a volume until his last state supreme court case, Dubois v.
Bowles, in 30 Colorado.
Browne was the wag and the wit of the Colorado bar.
He would rather get off a good joke than win a verdict. There
are many stories told about his courtroom wit. One in-
stance accredited to Browne occurred in Judge Hallet's court.
Browne by mistake sat down in a chair in which a tack had
been inverted. Arising with alacrity, he bowed deeply, and
handing the judge the tack, he said, "The court is sharp at
the wrong end."
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Another time Browne was questioning an old Spanish.
Mexican who had stated he was 120 years old.
"Are you married?" Browne inquired.
"Cassara-many times," the old fellow replied, meaning
that he had numerous wives, as morganatic marriages were
common in the Southwest.
"Do you drink?"
"Si-Taos lightning. I was raised on it." Taos light-
ning was the most fiery of frontier liquors.
"That's all," waved Browne in dismissal. "I know what
to do now to prolong life."
In spite of Browne's love for a joke, he had a great ca-
pacity for work. He was exceedingly industrious and put
forth all of his efforts to win his case. Some of the methods
he employed would not be countenanced today, but in the days
in which he lived they were readily accepted. Typical of
these methods was his defense in the Union Pacific-Colorado
Central railroad case. The Union Pacific filed an injunction
in the Boulder district court to enjoin the Colorado Central
from bidding on a certain right of way which the Union
Pacific coveted. The case was to be tried before Ambrose
Stone. Under the rules of court of that day was the provision
that if the judge did not appear on the third day after the
opening of the term, which was set by statute, then the term
lapsed and the 4udge could not sit in the district for another
six months inasmuch as there was only two terms of court a
year. Browne suggested to Judge Stone that he ride to Boul-
der on the Colorado Central and in that way view the disputed
territory. Judge Stone agreed, and a day before the term in
which the case was to be tried he was riding on the train to
Boulder when suddenly the train came to an abrupt stop.
Men wearing masks swarmed on the train, carried off Judge
Stone, and disappeared without disturbing the rest of the
passengers. The Judge was held in the mountains for three
days by his masked captors who, while otherwise courteous
and attendant to the judge, refused to speak in his presence.
On the fourth night he was returned unharmed to his home.
During the six months interval before the next term of court,
the Colorado Central had built past the point in question, and
the Union Pacific was forced to drop the suit.
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In spite of his extensive practice, Browne was never too
busy to welcome and encourage the embryo lawyer. He de-
voted many hours of his time to advising young attorneys and
helping them to secure an office. The tribute paid to him
upon his death' fully sets forth Browne's philosophy of the
law:
"His never failing high spirits made him immune to the annoyances
and inconvenience incident to general practice in territorial days. The im-
promptu nature of trials never embarrassed him, and his ready comprehension
of the nature of a case and his charm of argument secured as effective results
as usually fall only to the most labored profession-no one had greater freedom
of expression in the courts than he and no court was so dignified as to be able
wholly to restrain his brilliant rallies. That he was never called to task was
a tribute to the generous character of his wit."
Everyone always spoke of his cheerfulness and his wit.
Wilbur F. Stone said of him :'
"Browne was the life of all parties. He was surrounded by an atmos-
phere of sunshine; was never too busy when you met to stop and say a merry
word. Everywhere everybody expected something pleasant from him, and they
were never disappointed-I don't suppose there is a man living in Denver
who was better known or better liked than Sam Browne."
A born leader of men, Browne swept them along with
him because of his fervent speech, his virileness, and his ad-
venturesome air. Regarded as a strong delegate at political
conventions, he enjoyed nothing more than to deliver a fiery
political harangue. He had a wide vocabulary and a forceful
manner of delivery. His weakness and faults, though well
known, were absorbed by his geniality, his generosity, his in-
tegrity, and his engaging and attractive manner. He was
democratic in his taste and friendships and Catholic in his
opinions. Regarded as an able manager of estates, he was
careless in his own business affairs and made no provision for
his old age. Though he had earned large fees when he was
actually engaged in practice, the last two years of his life found
him in straitened financial circumstances. In addition, his
mental and physical faculties failed, but withal he retained
his cheerfulness. He began the deep sleep May 29, 1902."0
8 Vol. 1, Denver Bar Ass'n Rep. 89 (1903).
'Denver Republican May 31, 1902.
10Browne was buried May 31, 1902.
+++ Dictaphun +++
HUMOUR: A LA DEMOCRAT
As was announced exclusively in these columns last month, selected
samples of English humour will be reprinted. Hon. Lawrence Lewis (Con-
gressman to you!) is responsible for this material. If you like it we will
take pride in pointing out that we used it. If you don't like it we will view
with alarm the fact that we must use what we can get. We take this oppor-
tunity, however, to deny, that in consideration of the use of his contribution
Mr. Lewis has agreed to make the editor of this monument of wit United
States Attorney, Collector of Customs, Collector of Internal Revenue, Direc-
tor of the Mint and/or Custodian of the Federal Building. The contract is
that we are to be Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Marine expeditions
against defenseless and harmless republics, preferably members of the Pan
American Union.
So-o-o-o-o, relayed by Congressman Lewis as aforesaid, we find these in
the London Times, dates not stated and to the editor unknown:
A LEGAL RIDDLE
To the Editor of the Times: In my chambers the other day there fore-
gathered a group of young members of the Bar, talking "shop." To them
I presented a very old but pretty little problem, and left them arguing. It
may yet interest some of those who delight in such cases.
Udoxes* contracted to instruct Harmonius* in rhetoric. The arrange-
ment was that Harmonius should pay a fee in two instalments. The first was
to be paid at once. The second was conditional on Harmonius succeeding
in his first case: should he lose, then he could consider his instruction poor
and the second instalment cancelled. He paid the first instalment and was
duly instructed: but failed altogether to practice. Becoming impatient at the
delay, after two years had passed Udoxes sued him for the balance of the fee.
He argued thus:-"If I win this suit, then Harmonius must-by judgment-
pay me. If I lose it, then he will have won his first suit and will still have
to pay me." It seemed that he was in an unassailable position. Harmonius,
however, argued otherwise. "If Udoxes wins the suit against me, then I shall
have lost my first suit and need not pay him. If, on the other hand, I win the
case, then by judgment of the Court I need not pay him."
History does not relate the result of the suit.
Yours, &c.,
33, Devonshire-street, W. I. R. LLOYD.
A LEGAL RIDDLE
To the Editor of the Times: If one of Mr. Lloyd's young friends were (with
appropriate fee) instructed to advise poor Eudoxes§ how to bring the shabby
*Neither the Editor nor Mr. Lewis are responsible for these dizzy names.
§Note this interesting variant in the spelling of the name of the unfortunate in-
structor.
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Harmonius to book, he might perhaps recommend him to avoid the dilemma
suggested by amending his statement of claim and seeking to recover, instead
of the balance of the fee, damages for breach of a plainly implied underlying
term of the contract-namely, that Harmonius would bona fide and within a
reasonable time engage in practice, and so seek to obtain and win a case. On
the facts stated by Mr. Lloyd such term, was broken and there would be no
defense to the claim as amended, the measure of damages being, it is true, not
necessarily the unpaid balance of the fee, but such damages as the jury might
think Eudoxes lost by the breach of contract. In any case the plaintiff should
secure his costs-the thing which really matters!-HIS HONOUR JUDGE
BARNARD bAILEY, Swanmore, Hants.
A LEGAL RIDDLE
To the Editor of the Times: The problem of the contract between Har-
monius and Udoxes, quoted by Mr. R. Lloyd in your issue of December 6,
appears to be an adaptation of the anecdote told of Corax of Syracuse, about
465 B. C., whom Aristotle regarded as the father of forensic rhetoric. Corax
(Crow) had a pupil named Tisias. The anecdote is quoted, with reference
to its sources, in J. F. Dobson's "The Greek Orators," and is as follows:-
Tisias took lessons from Corax on condition that he should pay the fee
only if he won his first case in Court. After some lapse of time Corax grew
impatient for his money, and finally brought an action-the first case, as it
happened, on which Tisias was ever engaged. Corax asserted, "If I win this
case, I get my money by the verdict; if I lose it, I claim payment by our con-
tract." "No," said Tisias, "if I win, I don't pay, and if I lose, I don't pay."
The Court dismissed the case with the remark, "A bad crow lays bad
eg s.9 Yours, &c.,
J. H. WEATHERALL
Essex Manse, W. 8.
All of which reminds us of the classic remark said to have been addressed
to Ralph Hartzell by Judge Hallett. It appears Ralph had sought in some
forty ways to get certain testimony admitted and without success. At last
he appealed to the court, asking his honor how the evidence could be gotten
in. Said Hallett, J: "I suggest, Mr. Hartzell, that you might employ
counsel."
MR. JONES SOUNDS OFF
Mr. Louis A. Hellerstein, Editor-in-Chief, Dicta,
1020 University Bldg., Denver, Colorado.
Dear Mr. Hellerstein:
In the September, 1932, number of Dicta, No. 16 of "Dictaphun," which
refers to an incident in Judge Hallett's court, states that: "He entered the
court room without taking off his hat and smoking a cigar." (Italics mine.)
I can understand the rule about the hat; but the rule in respect to the
cigar must have been hard on nonsmokers.
Cordially yours, JAMES R. JONES.
(EoITo's NoTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digeests.)
CRIMES-MURDER-TIME FOR TRIAL-ATTORNEY APPOINTED BY COURT-
Carlson vs. The People-No. 13034-Decided October 3, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Butler.
I.
An attorney, appointed eight days after a homicide, when his client is
confined to the psychopathic hospital four days after the attorney is appointed
and when his client is retained there for five days throughout which time the
attorney is refused the opportunity of communicating with his client, does
not have sufficient time within which to prepare for trial when the trial is set
for five days after his client's release from the hospital. It is error to refuse
to grant a motion for continuance even though the motion be technically
imperfect.
II.
In appointing counsel for a defendant without means, it is the duty of
the Court to determine that counsel is appointed with adequate ability and
experience to fairly represent the defendant.-Judgment reversed.
FORECLOSURES-REDEMPTION BY ASSERTED ENCUMBRANCER-Carson vs.
Bradford, et al.-No. 12775-Decided October 10, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Alter.
Plaintiff gave a chattel mortgage and a second trust deed to secure two
notes to H. The chattels were later sold to R. on execution, subject to the
chattel mortgage. R. paid the balance due on the two notes, which were
then endorsed in blank and delivered to R. with the chattel mortgage and
second trust deed. K. secured the notes and second trust deed from R. and,
claiming a balance due on the notes, redeemed from a sale on foreclosure of
the first trust deed. Plaintiff still had time to redeem but made no attempt
to do so, and the property was redeemed by a third encumbrancer who, with
full knowledge of tile facts, paid the amount which K. had paid plus the
amount which K. claimed was still due on the two notes.
Under these facts it was held that, whether or not the lien of the chattel
mortgage had merged in the ownership title of R. and the notes had thus been
paid by operation of law, requiring a release of the second trust deed, never-
theless the plaintiff, having made no effort to protect his equity of redemption,
could not sustain an action against R. and K. for securing a fraudulent over-
payment of the two notes.-Judgment affirmed.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES PROVIDING FOR
ATTENDANT AT GAS FILLING STATION--Starkey vs. City of Longmont-
No. 12821-Decided October 10, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Starkey was fined for violating a city ordinance by operating a gasoline
filling station without a license. To review that judgment, he prosecuted
error.
1. A municipal corporation under its police power may provide that
an attendant must be in charge of any activity which may imperil public
safety or morality.
2. A municipal corporation has the power to pass an ordinance
requiring the presence of an attendant at a gasoline filling station.
3. The dispensing of gasoline is of such a dangerous character that an
ordinance requiring an attendant and thereby prohibiting the use of "slot"
machine gasoline filling stations is a valid exercise of the police power.
4. Such an ordinance is not void on the ground of uncertainty, dis-
crimination, unreasonableness or of invasion of personal and property rights,
or of violation of due processes or of Federal and State Constitutions.-
Judgment affirmed.
MECHANICS LIENS-COMPLETION OF BUILDING-FURNISHING EXCESSIVE
MATERIAL-Mortgage Brokerage Company et al. vs. W. B. Barr Lumber
Company et al.-No. 12734-Decided October 17, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler.
1. One who furnishes materials to the owner is a principal contractor,
and, as such, has three months after completion of the building within which
to file his lien statement.
2. Where the owner moves into a house which is in fact not completed,
and on which further work is done, there is more than a trivial imperfection
in the work, and such occupancy does not constitute constructive completion
for purposes of determining the time when lien statements must be filed.
3. If the owner, who is building other houses in the vicinity, has ma-
terials for all houses delivered to one house, upon which he has already ob-
tained a loan for purposes of getting additional materials, so that the other
houses will be free of liens, and if the materialman knowingly helps to carry
out such a scheme by delivering more material than could be used in the con-
struction of the one house, its fraudulent conduct will prevent the enforcement
of a lien in any amount as against the holder of the encumbrance.
4. If the materialman, though not participating in such a scheme, fur-
nished material with knowledge that some of it was to be used in the con-
struction of other houses, it could not, as against the holder of the encum-
brance, enforce a lien for the material which it knew was to be used else-
where.-Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
AUTOMOBILES-CERTIFICATE OF TITLE-SHORT CHECK-INNOCENT PARTY
-RIGHTS OF-Shockley vs. Hill-No. 12904-Decided October 17, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Action below was replevin for automobile. Hill, auto dealer in Illinois,
sold auto to one Goodman, taking check in payment and delivered auto, but
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later check was returned no good. Auto passed by transfer into hands of
Shockley who paid value and was innocent purchaser.
1. Where seller seeks to replevin auto from a third party, who pur-
chased in good faith and for value from intermediate party who exhibited
indicia of ownership and was in possession, seller cannot recover.
2. Where one of two innocent persons must suffer loss by reason of the
fraud or deceit of another, the loss should fall on him by whose act or omis-
sion the wrongdoer has been enabled to commit the fraud.
3. If the buyer by fraudulent devises secures possession without paying
the purchase price, a bona fide purchaser from him for value would acquire
a good title as against the seller's right to retake possession.-Judgment re-
versed.
LEASES-TERMS OF-INDUCEMENTS To-PRooF oF-Frosh vs. The Sun
Drug Company-No. 12680-Decided October 17, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
1. Where, prior to the time a lease is executed, the lessor agrees to
perform certain acts and make certain repairs, though these matters are not
set out in the lease, they may be proved for they do not vary the terms of a
written instrument.
2. Where the heating plant of a business location was improperly con-
structed and maintained and this fact was known to both parties prior to the
execution of the lease and the lessor had promised the lessee to repair it but
he had failed to do so, the promise of the lessor in such a case is admissable
in a suit against the lessee for rent, not to vary the terms of a written instru-
ment but to evidence matters of inducement.
3. When the lessee has paid rent for more than a year, he has not waived
the injury when it is shown that the lessee was continually complaining and
demanding relief and that the lessor was continually promising the necessary
repairs.-Judgment affirmed.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-IN CIVIL ACTIONS-ALLEGATIONS IN-SUF-
FICIENCY OF-Slee v. Simpson-No. 12,708-Decided October 24, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. In a prior suit in which plaintiff sought to recover for personal
injuries, defendant had filed a counter-claim. Plaintiff had recovered judg-
ment for $8,000, which remains unpaid; and now brings this action for
malicious prosecution based upon defendant's counter-claim. After a motion
to strike filed by the defendant, which was sustained, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint to which defendant demurred. The demurrer was sus-
tained. Plaintiff elected to stand on her amended complaint, whereupon
defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.
2. Although, as a general rule, actions for malicious prosecution are
not encouraged, such an action may be maintained against one who maliciously
and without probable cause attempts to prosecute a claim.
3. A counter-claim is the same as a new suit, the defendant being
treated as a plaintiff and having the burden of proving the allegations set out
in the counter-claim.
DICTA
4. As long as a cause of action was properly pleaded in this case, a
demurrer to the complaint should not have been sustained.-Judgment
reversed.
TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS--INSTITUTIONS FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATION-
Denver Turnverein vs. McGlone, Manager of Revenue, etc.-No. 12,971
-Decided October 24, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. The teaching of physical culture is comprehended by the term
"education", and is within the purview of Sec. 5, Art. X, of the Constitution
of Colorado, and Sec. 7198, C. L. 1921, making property used solely for
schools, and not held or used for private profit, exempt from general tax
levy.-Judgment reversed.
LIVE STOCK-SUIT AGAINST STATE AGENCY-LIMITATIONS---INTEREST-
Alfred et al vs. Esse---No. 12,71 1-Decided October 24, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. A suit against the members of the state board of stock inspection
commissioners, to recover the proceeds of a sale of estray cattle, is main-
tainable.
2. The statutes concerning the sale of estray cattle by the state board
contemplate notice to the owner of the cattle, and until such notice is given
the limitations in Sec. 3221 C. L. 1921, against recovery of the proceeds of
the sale, do not operate against the owner.
3. The owner is entitled to interest on the proceeds of a sale of his
cattle equal in amount to that actually received by the state board while the
fund was in its possession.-Judgment affirmed.
APPELLATE PRACTICE-AssIGNMENTS OF ERROR--Samuel Cunningham et al
vs. Nellie Mae Snelling and Roy G. Cook-No. 12,628-Decided October
24, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where there is no compliance with Rule 32, Supreme Court Rules,
the alleged assignments present nothing for review.
2. An assignment that the court erred in entering judgment and in
overruling a motion for a rehearing is no assignment at all. It is merely
equivalent to stating in general terms that the Court " * * was wrong in its
judgment."
3. An assignment stating that the court erred in excluding or admitting
evidence, without further particularity, cannot be considered.-Judgment
affirmed.
CONTRACTs--BREACH OF CONTRACT-FINDINGS OF JURY-School Dist.
No. 16, in the County of Fremont, et al vs. Murray-No. 12,695-
Decided October 24, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. In an action "by plaintiff, a school teacher, for her wages under a
written contract, when the school board confesses judgment, and is satisfied
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with said judgment, it is doubtful if the taxpayers may maintain or supplement
themselves to defeat this action.
2. The questions of fact were resolved by the jury in favor of the
plaintiff and there was unquestioned credible evidence fully justifying its
findings.-Judgment affirmed.
MOTOR VEHICLES-COLLISIoN-RIGHT OF WAY-Stocker vs. Newcomb-
No. 12,616-Decided October 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
A4dams.
1. Where more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the
evidence it is not proper for the trial court to invade the province of the jury.
2. The rule that an automobile driver on the left should yield the right
of way to the one on the right does not deprive the driver on the left of his
lawful right to use of the highway nor entitle the driver on the right to drive
in a reckless fashion.-Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
INDUSTRIAL COMPENSATION-LEx Loci CONTRACTUS-RIGHT OF RECOVERY
UNDER COLORADO LAW WHERE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IN COLORADO
BUT INJURIES ARE SUSTAINED OUTSIDE OF STATE-The Home Insurance
Company et al vs. Hepp-No. 13,145-Decided October 31, 1932-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. In an Industrial Compensation case the findings of fact were that
the decedent had entered into his contract of employment in the State of
Colorado, but the major portion of his services were to be performed in the
state of New Mexico, and that he was killed while driving his automobile
in the state of New Mexico. Judgment for compensation under the Colorado
Workmen's Compensation Act was awarded the heirs of insured and the
defendant appealed.
2. Where the contract of employment is entered into in Colorado it
is not essential, in order that recovery may be had for injuries sustained while
employed under such contract, that the principal portion of services thereunder
were to be performed in the State of Colorado.-Judgment affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENs-TRUST DEEDS-PRIORITY-Longton vs. Husung-
No. 12,633-Decided November 7, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
1. The purchaser of certain real property agreed with the vendor to
make specific improvements thereon. The purchaser also gave the vendor
a second deed of trust, which was recorded. Thereafter, the specified im-
provements were made, and a mechanic's lien was filed for labor and ma-
terials furnished in making the improvements. The lienor knew of the
contract requiring the making of the improvements. The lien was held to
have priority over the second deed of trust under Sec. 6444 C. L. 1921,
because the improvements enhanced the value of the vendor's security, and
because the improvements were required by the contract which was entered
into at the same time that the vendor's second deed of trust was executed.-
Judgment affirmed.
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